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ABSTRACT
This study examined the effects of thought suppression on later recall of valenced 
material. According to Wegner’s (1994) theory of ironic mental processes, effortful 
attempts at thought suppression result in an increased accessibility o f the to-be- 
suppressed thought under conditions of high cognitive load. Participants (N = 180) 
received an induced-sadness manipulation before being asked to concentrate on 
associations between visual images (either a white bear or a brown rabbit) and 28 
adjectives (14 positively-valenced, 14 negatively-valenced). After a five minute period of 
suppressing thoughts of one of the visual images, participants were asked to remember as 
many of the 28 adjectives as possible. It was hypothesized that those participants who 
used a guided distraction task under conditions of high cognitive load would have higher 
accessessibility to the suppressed thoughts and recall a greater number of adjectives 
associated with those thoughts. Although the expected interaction between suppression 
type and memory load was not observed (p = .87), participants in the negative 
suppression group recalled fewer positive words than either the positive suppression 
group or the control group (neutral suppression; p = .04). In addition, a marginally 
significant interaction (p = .06) did emerge for the difference score between positive and 
negative adjectives recalled when only individuals with high mathematical-visual 
memory were included in the analysis. Implications for future research are discussed, as 
well as how the technique could be applied in a clinical setting.
XI
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“Try not to think about that,” is exceedingly common advice provided to people 
who are having unwanted thoughts, worries, and feelings of sadness or depression. 
However Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) provided evidence that such 
advice may often be counterproductive. When participants were asked to not think about 
a white bear, they were more likely to report thinking about a white bear both during and 
after the period of attempted thought suppression, as compared to nonthought suppressing 
control participants. The tendency for thought suppression to actually lead to a greater 
number of unwanted intrusions is known as an immediate enhancement effect. The 
tendency for the unwanted thought to occur more frequently after the period of 
suppression is known as the rebound effect. Lavy and van den Hout (1990) replicated 
both the enhancement effect and the rebound effect using a less visually stimulating 
thought of a “vehicle.”
Wegner (1989) hypothesized that self-distraction is the major method by which 
people perform thought suppression. He proposed that the only way that a person can not 
think of one thing is to fill current consciousness with distracting thoughts. However, this 
method has been found to actually result hi increased accessibility of the suppressed 
thought under conditions of high cognitive load.
1
2Wegner (1994) has proposed a theory of ironic processes of mental control. He 
hypothesized the existence of two separate mechanisms involved in thought suppression. 
First, an effortful operating process works to find and fill consciousness with thoughts 
that are not the thought that is currently being suppressed. Meanwhile, an automatic 
monitoring process searches for the actual thought that is trying to be avoided. The 
monitoring process is necessary in order for a person to know whether or not they have 
been successful at not thinking of the suppressed thought. However, these two processes 
are independent of each other in that one process works automatically without awareness 
(monitoring process) while the other works with conscious control and attention. When 
the individual is able to devote attention tc effortful distraction, the conscious process has 
a larger impact than the automatic process on working memory, and the thought is 
successfully suppressed. However, when working memory is somehow limited through 
divided attention, the theory of ironic processes predicts that the monitoring process will 
have a larger impact, paradoxically making the suppressed thought even more accessible 
than if it had not been suppressed in the first place.
Empirical evidence for the ironic theory of mental processes was supplied by 
Wegner and Erber (1992). Participants in their first of two experiments were asked to 
either think or not think about a target word (e.g., house). Then, participants engaged in a 
word association task with prompts that were either related (e.g., home) or unrelated (e.g., 
adult) to the original target. The researchers varied the cognitive load by subjecting 
participants to either a long (10 seconds) or a short (3 seconds) delay between prompt and 
required associative response. As expected, participants who were asked to concentrate
3on the target word, gave the target word as an associative answer significantly more often 
when they had a short time pressure. However, the participants who were subjected to a 
suppression condition under long time pressure were also very likely to respond with the 
word that they had been instructed to suppress. In fact, they were more likely to respond 
with the forbidden word than subjects who had been given the instruction to concentrate 
on the word and then required to respond under time pressure. In other words, time 
pressure appeared to reverse the trend of mental control. Ironically, those participants 
who were concentrating found the word less accessible while those participants who were 
suppressing found the word more accessible.
A second experiment also demonstrated this ironic effect (Wegner & Erber,
1992). Participants were again presented with word primes and the instructions were to 
suppress or concentrate on the given words. Then a Stroop (1935) task was performed in 
which the word primes served as the distractors. Cognitive load was manipulated by 
asking participants to either remember a two-digit number (low load) or a nine-digit 
number (high load). Participants who were under conditions of high load and thought 
suppression exhibited the highest degree of inhibition, as evidenced by longer mean 
response times (error rates were not reported). Presumably, participants had less 
attentional capacities to search for distractors. Therefore, the automatic monitoring 
proces° made the suppressed word more accessible and, thus, more probable to interfere 
with the processing of word color.
Another ironic effect was described by Wegner (1994), in which a high cognitive 
load caused participants to fail to completely ignore irrelevant information during a long­
4term memory task. The task involved memorizing the names of unfamiliar cities that 
were highlighted in yellow. Although memory for the yellow, highlighted cities suffered 
as a result of cognitive load, these subjects were able to recall more of the nonhighlighted 
cities than subjects not subjected to high cognitive load.
Wegner (1989) has suggested that failed attempts at thought suppression may be 
related to the development of depressions and obsessions as well as inabilities to dismiss 
habitual thoughts (e.g., thoughts of food during dieting or thoughts o f substance use 
during abstinence). Wegner’s theory has seen an abundance of theoretical and empirical 
extensions, as described below.
One experiment has shown that impression formation may be disrupted when 
people attempt to ignore previously primed traits (Newman, Duff, Hedberg, & Blitstein, 
1996). During the experiment, participants were asked to talk about people that they 
knew. Some of the participants were asked to suppress information about a particular 
trait. Those participants told to suppress discussion of a trait, however, were more likely 
to describe a new individual as possessing the previously suppressed trait, but only under 
conditions o f high cognitive load.
The rebound effect (tendency for suppressed information to become more 
accessible following the period of suppression) has also been suggested as an explanation 
for why people sometimes succumb to the use of various stereotypes despite intentions to 
avoid them (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). In the experiment, 
participants were presented with a picture of a male skinhead, and asked to write a paper 
about a typical day for the pictured individual. Half the participants did so while
5suppressing stereotypic thoughts of skinheads, while the rest of the participants were 
given no such admonition. Participants who had suppressed stereotypic thoughts were 
more likely to (a) write stereotypically on a second writing task, (b) choose a seat further 
away from a skinhead, and (c) show a facilitatory priming effect on a lexical decision task 
with stereotypic targets.
Even the suppression of pain may actually increase sensitivity to future pain 
(Cioffi & Holloway, 1993). Participants instructed to suppress the sensation created 
during a cold pressor task took longer to show decreases in pain ratings and were more 
likely to rate subsequent vibrations from a massager as uncomfortable. The rebound 
effect has social and medical implications, and the current study wishes to suggest 
specific clinical implications, as well.
Mood Control and Clinical Implications
Empirical results have shown that depression is strongly associated with negative 
biases in attention, thinking, and memory (Gelder, 1997). Depression facilitates the 
retrieval of negative information (Clark & Teasdale, 1982), which serves to magnify the 
significance of negative information, especially in relation to the self (Mathews, 1997).
Early work in the cognitive theory of depression suggested that depression 
represents an increased accessibility to negative schemas, models of interpreting 
environmental stimuli that are predisposed to depressive conclusions (Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery, 1979). More recent theory suggests that it is not necessarily the schemas 
themselves that are more accessible. Instead, it is the relationship between negative 
cognitive schemas and negative interpretations of the self that is more accessible
6(Teasdale, 1997). Thus, even when depressed and nondepressed individuals agree on the 
negative aspects of an event, depressed individuals are more likely to see it as related to 
personal inadequacy. Such processing occurs automatically.
Teasdale (1997) has suggested that:
the task of psychological treatments is to create a store of alternative 
depression-related models associated with a wide variety of possible 
eliciting contexts . . . .  These alternative models will need to be 
sufficiently similar to depressogenic models that they will be accessed 
from memory by the same cues or contexts that would otherwise access 
depressogenic m odels.. . .  These alternative models will need to differ 
from depressogenic models so that they will not, themselves, elicit 
depression, (p. 85)
The above goal, in summary, is to create positive schema and then rehearse a 
relationship between existing automatic negative schema. Oddly, most forms of cognitive 
therapy involve changes in effortful thinking and meta-cognition (Williams, 1997) such 
as identifying automatic thoughts and combating irrational beliefs. With practice, these 
interventions have an impact on automatic processes, but direct manipulation of the 
automatic processes are rarely the focus of cognitive interventions. Engaging ironic 
processes in therapy may help to more directly address the goal of change in automatic 
processing.
Ironic processes involved in mood control were first examined by Wegner, Erber, 
and Zanakos (1993). They asked participants to: (a) generate either a sad or happy event
7from their own experiences, (b) think about the experience, and (c) write whatever came 
to mind. Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (a) asked 
to feel the emotion associated with the event, (b) asked to not feel the emotion associated 
with the event, (c) not given any instructions concerning emotional regulation. Those 
participants who were asked to remember a nine-digit number while attempting to change 
their mood in a negative direction, actually ended up with significantly higher ratings of 
happiness than those people who attempted to elicit a positive mood during high load. In 
fact, trend analysis supported the hypothesis that participants were able to control moods 
during low cognitive load. However, under high load, effects of mood control attempts 
were diametrically opposite those intended. In other words, high load resulted in subjects 
not being able to control mood.
Clinical depression, therefore, may be at least in part due to failed attempts at 
suppressing depressive thoughts (Wegner, 1989). Most people in a depressed state 
attempt to improve their moods by consciously searching long-term memory for positive 
thoughts. Concurrently, an automatic search for failure (negative or neutral thoughts) also 
begins and continues until a conscious thought to discontinue the mood-changing effort 
occurs. Generally, this dual process functions to bring positive thoughts into the 
conscious work space and alert the individual to failures and the need for additional effort 
(Howell & Conway, 1992; Wegner, 1992; Wenzlaff, 1993). However, when the 
individual is operating under conditions of stress, time pressure, and/or cognitive work 
load, the operating system has less attentional space in order to perform its job. This may 
lead to the ironic hyper-accessibility of negative thoughts that are being monitored by the
8automatic search. Thus, the theory predicts that people who are attempting to improve 
their mood while under conditions of depleted attentional space will paradoxically 
become progressively more depressed.
Paradoxical Interventions
Until now, the theory of ironic mental processes has been used as a partial 
explanation for how depression and anxiety may develop. Shoham and Rohrbaugh (1997) 
have recently emphasized that clinicians should fully investigate ways of interrupting 
damaging ironic processes. The present researcher is interested in the possibility' of 
harnessing the theory of ironic mental processes to treat depression.
Since Frankl’s (1960) seminal publication on paradoxical treatments, such 
interventions have become an integral pail of mainstream psychotherapeutic practice. 
Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson (1967) have described the therapeutic paradox as a 
“pragmatic paradox.” These occur when the therapist provides a directive in which 
benefits emerge regardless of whether the client successfully completes the instruction.
Weeks and L’Abate (1982) have reviewed a number of paradoxical techniques. 
For instance, reframing and relabeling are techniques in which the nature of the symptom 
is conversely connotated in order to change a person’s perspective. Symptom prescription 
is a technique in which clients are asked to schedule or exacerbate the symptom in some 
way, with the outcome often being that clients discover increased control over their 
problems. Restraining client progress by requesting that they not try to change too fast is 
another technique used to give control of a symptom to the client. If progress is slow or 
relapses occur, the client can see this as an expected outcome that was predicted by the
9therapist, while going against the therapist results in a sense of mastery and control for the 
client.
Paradoxical treatments can be roughly divided into two varieties: compliance- 
based and defiance-based. Compliance-based suggestions are those which the therapist 
truly intends for the client to attempt. Defiance-based directives are those which the 
therapist believes may act as a catalyst for change or decision-making, even though 
actually following the directive would likely increase symptoms further.
Meta-analyses have lent empirical support to the effectiveness of many 
paradoxical techniques (Hampton & Hulgus, 1993). Evidence suggests that reframing is 
especially useful with depressed clients (Debord, 1989), and that combining symptom 
prescription with reframing may further increase treatment efficacy (Hunsley, 1993). A 
recent meta-analysis found little empirical support for defiance-based symptom 
prescription, while a growing body of literature supports the efficacy of compliance-based 
symptom prescription (Hunsley, 1997).
Thus, a therapist using a paradoxical treatment with depressed clients may begin 
by asserting that the depression has some positive attributes. One example may be 
relabeling the depression as an exceptional ability to understand personal faults. Clients 
are then requested to schedule extended periods of time experiencing and exaggerating 
the depressed feelings. Finally, clients are cautioned against giving up their depression 
too fast, given the “risks” that may exist with such rapid change.
Weeks and L’Abate (1982) have described a particularly relevant technique for 
the treatment of depression. A depressed man was instructed to note when he began
10
feeling better. At those times, he was asked to try to prolong the depressed feelings an 
additional 15 minutes before allowing the positive affect to continue. The authors 
explained that the man experienced a decrease in his depressive symptoms due to an 
increased sense of control over his mood states. However, another explanation may exist.
Wegner (1989) has suggested that paradoxical intentions work because they allow 
the person to turn off the monitoring process that is actually making the thought more 
accessible and more disturbing. This, is likely to be the case in more traditional forms of 
symptom prescription, relabeling/reframing, and restraining. However, the above case 
study may, in fact, be harnessing the ironic process, if the man interprets the task as 
attempting to suppress the positive affect. If trying to not think about negative thoughts 
causes depression, it seems reasonable that trying to not think about positive thoughts will 
lead to elation (or at least a decrease in depression) under certain conditions. Since the 
combination of cognitive load and intention to change the contents of attention result in 
the opposite of the intention, one way of treating depression may be to prescribe the 
structured suppression of positive thoughts. There are several reasons why this may be 
preferable to traditional paradoxical intentions of prescribing depression.
First, one recent study has shown that thoughts that are both personally relevant 
and troubling cause the most discomfort when they are suppressed, moderate discomfort 
when they are intentionally thought about (prescribed symptom), and relatively low 
discomfort when the thought frequency is simply recorded (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994). 
This effect was sustained over a four-day period.
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Wegner (1994) theorized that there is more than just a semantic difference 
between thinking depressed thoughts and not thinking positive thoughts. Theoretically, 
trying to suppress thoughts requires a completely different set of cognitive functions than 
trying to concentrate on thoughts. For instance, to think about depressive thoughts, the 
effortful system will search for depressive thoughts while the ironic automatic system will 
search for either positive or neutral thoughts. Since depression typically co-occurs with 
attentional impairments (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993), the effortful 
search is likely to suffer while the automatic process functions without deficit. The result 
would be increased accessibility of both positive and negative thoughts.
Now suppose that a depressed person is asked to not think of positive thoughts. 
This may appear to be the same task, but Wegner (1994) argues that it involves slightly 
different tasks for the effortful and automatic processes. In this case, the effortful process 
involves the search for either neutral or negative thoughts, while the automatic process 
involves the search for only positive thoughts. In a sense, the effect of the automatic 
process is now more potent because the positive thoughts will not be contaminated by the 
presence of neutral thoughts.
Of course, one problem is that depressed patients would be more likely to 
generate negative distractors. For instance, Howell and Conway (1991) found that during 
induced sadness, participants were more likely to use other negative thoughts to distract 
themselves from a suppressed negative thought than nonsadness induced participants. Of 
particular interest is the finding that sadness-induced participants were more likely to use 
positive distractors when distracting themselves from positive thoughts. The researchers
12
hypothesized that a depressed state encourages the use of inefficient distr otors (e.g., 
positive distractors for the suppression of positive thoughts). This inefficiency was not 
replicated when a naturally-occurring depressed population was studied. However, the 
measure of the distractor valences was done by raters. Perhaps the emotional significance 
of thoughts from a depressed person were more difficult for raters tc understand.
The strongest theoretical basis for the mood-altering properties of positive- 
thought suppression was laid out in Wegner’s (1989) conception of distracting thoughts. 
As a person attempts to rid her- or himself of a thought. * ey fill their limited attention 
with incongruous thoughts. However, because of the automatic monitoring system, the 
suppressed thought is likely to intrude from time to time. With each intrusion, the 
distracting thought becomes paired through assoc ation with the intruding thought. The 
failed distractor is abandoned, and a new distractor is obtained. However, the failed 
distractor is now likely to serve as a reminder of the of the forbidden thought.
Wegner, Short, Blake, and Page (1990) have demonstrated that suppression of an 
exciting thought (sex) leads to elevations in skin conductance level (SCL). However, in 
comparison to participants who were asked to try to think of sex, subsequent intrusive 
thoughts of sex among previous suppressors resulted in significantly greater SCL 
responses. The authors explained this pattern of behavior as a rebound effect in which the 
thought of sex had a greater cognitive impact on the previously suppressing participants.
If a person is ever tempted to suppress pleasant or enjoyable thoughts 
the same processes illustrated in these studies might apply. Sex, after all, 
is a fine example of an enjoyable thought that can seem worthy of
13
suppressing in certain circumstances. Like trying not to think of sex, trying 
not to think of anything that yields positive emotion should promote the 
perpetuation of a bodily response. So the unwanted positive emotion could 
be produced by the very attempts one makes to bring it under conticl. 
(Wegner, et al., 1990, p. 417).
There are several conditions that would make positive suppression more probable. 
For instance, Wegner, Schneider, Knutson, and McMahon (1991) demonstrated that the 
rebound effect is most pronounced when the period following suppression is spent in a 
similar environment to the place in which the original thought suppression took place 
(watching the same slide-show over and over again). Thus, although people must 
eventually learn to deal with intrusive thoughts in their own familiar environments, 
people are likely to experience a rebound of intrusions if they spend post-suppression 
time in the environment in which suppression originally took place.
While not thinking about positive thoughts may lead to the use of negative 
distractors, these negative distractors are likely to become associated with the positive 
thought that is being suppressed. Thus, one interesting possibility is that even though 
positive thoughts may be successfully blocked during suppression, future depressive 
ruminations are likely to be associated with the positive thought. It is this peculiar 
counterintuitive approach that may help to construct a balance between depressive and 
positive thoughts.
Now that an established theory supports the proposed paradoxical treatment, it is 
important to consider whether the mechanisms described are similar in both naturally
14
occurring and analogue states of depression. There are several reasons why analogue 
states of depression are preferred for participants in the current study.
Analogue Versus Naturally-Occurring Depression
Martin (1990) has reviewed a number of issues concerning the use of analogues 
instead of naturally-occurring depression. First, it is difficult to quickly assess the impact 
of a mood induction, given that there are great individual differences in the effect that 
mood inductions have on participants. Second, the mood induced may be qualitatively 
different from a clinically depressed state. Third, results from mood induction 
experiments could be explained as simply demand characteristics in which the 
participants attempt to demonstrate the effect desired by the researcher.
While individual differences exist, it should be considered that these differences 
could represent a constellation of antecedents for and protectors against the development 
of depression. For instance, Gouaux and Gouaux (1971) have suggested that women may 
be more likely to respond to certain induction techniques, but women are also more likely 
to be diagnosed with naturally-occurring depression. Schema theory of mood induction 
holds that only individuals who have pre-existing negative self-schemas are able to 
respond to negative mood inductions (Martin, 1990). While the negative schema are 
activated, it is quite possible that participants are operating similarly to actively depressed 
individuals.
Evidence supporting this proposition shows that mood inductions have an impact 
on a number of variables that would be similarly effected by naturally occurring 
depression. Velten (1968) demonstrated that writing speed, distance approximation,
15
decision time, word association, and spontaneous verbalization are all abnormal in mood 
induced participants. Clark (1983) has also shown expected disturbances in psychomotor 
responses, appetite, and motivation.
One recent study has shown that analogue depression participants have similar 
patterns of intercorrelations among measures of depressive symptoms (Cox, Enns,
Borger, & Parker, 1999). The major differences were in levels of symptoms rather than in 
types or constellations of symptoms.
O f course, mood induced participants may simply be acting as if they were 
depressed in order to please the experimenters. The most important arguments against 
this, however, come from research demonstrating that even involuntary, non-conscious 
behavior appears to be altered during many mood induction techniques. For instance, 
Teasdale and Bancroft (1977) have shown that corrugator electromyographic activity 
(muscle activity in the face) is impacted by mood induction.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to prefer an analogue to naturally-occurring 
depression, is in response to the potential risks involved. For instance, the treatment 
proposed requires that an unspecified cognitive load be reached before the ironic effects 
occur. If the treatment should fail to provide the required load, instructions to suppress 
positive thoughts will lead to successful suppression. In a naturally-occurring depressed 
population, such success could lead to a serious decompensation into further depression. 
Mood induction in normal participants, however, is comparatively short-lived (Gunther, 
Ferraro, & Kirchner, 1996; Martin, 1990), and suppression of positive thoughts has not
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been shown to be aversive to participants with normal emotional regulation (Howell & 
Conway, 1992).
Vredenburg, Flett, and Krames (1993) have also provided compelling reasons to 
employ a non-clinical sample in the current research. First, there is a reduced likelihood 
that the presence of other psychiatric disorders will confound the data. Second, 
psychoactive medications are far less likely to have been prescribed to members of a 
“normal” sample. Third, a non-clinical sample is less likely to have undergone other 
psychological treatments.
The Need for a New Approach
Although the proposed treatment may appear to be somewhat counter to current 
ideas in the field of cognitive therapy, the treatment is actually quite bound to the 
concepts put forth by Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979). It is assumed that depression 
is maintained by a negative cognitive schema. Depression is perpetuated by negative self­
statements and assumptions about the environment and future. Guiding a depressed client 
through the process of identifying and testing the validity of negative concepts is an 
effective way of treating depression. In addition, the proposed treatment may be one that 
works in an automatic way to restructure negative schemas and add positive, moderating 
cognitions to the mass of negative thoughts. The ironic process may be able to bypass the 
negative filter that is hypothesized to be present in the encoding process of depressives. 
Once set in motion, the effects of the proposed intervention may work on an inside-out 
basis while more traditional therapies may work on an outside-in basis.
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In addition to assumptions concerning cognitive processes, the proposed treatment 
involves certain assumptions concerning long-term memory. Because it is simpler to 
suppress a single thought, the proposed treatment will require that the individual form a 
schema around a particular imagined entity. The imagined entity will represent the 
individual, and the schema will involve positive thoughts about the individual. In a real- 
life therapeutic situation, the positive thoughts could be generated in collaboration with 
the client. Thus, the thoughts could be relevant to the person’s life and would necessarily 
be processed in both an effortful (during discussion of the thoughts to be suppressed) and 
automatic (during prescribed thought suppression) way. However, for the sake of 
standardization, the current experiment will use standardized images and standardized 
descriptors. Thus, the treatment assumes a spreading-activation model of memory 
(Anderson, 1988) in which activation of the image (through association with multiple 
distractors) will lead to a higher probability of activation of the ideas associated with the 
image.
Bower (1981) has supported an associative network theory of memory and 
emotion. According to his theory, emotions and memories can reciprocally activate each 
other. Thus, if a certain emotion is activated which has been previously associated with a 
particular experience, memory for that experience also becomes increasingly activated 
and accessible to memory. Conversely, activation of memories that were previously 
associated with particular emotions, result in greater activation of the emotion and 
schemas supporting the emotional state.
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In the current study, it is hoped that thought suppression will result in a rebound 
effect. If the suppressed element is a vivid visualization which has been associated with a 
number of positive adjectives, these adjectives should become more accessible during 
free recall. Finally, since these adjectives will have been processed in a self-referent way, 
it is hoped that memories for the positive adjectives will cause participants’ induced 
moods of sadness to dissipate more quickly.
However, a depressed state is likely to result in some degree of mood-congruent 
recall (Blaney, 1986). This pattern is especially true under conditions that encourage the 
processing of information in a self-referent manner, people are more likely to recall 
information that is valenced in the direction of their current mood. While the proposed 
treatment is unlikely to overcome the mood-congruent effect, it is likely that mood- 
congruent recall will be moderated by the ironic, automatic search process. This is 
especially likely since effortful processing is adversely affected by depression while 
automatic processes proceed relatively uninhibited (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & 
Dykman, 1993).
Statement of Problem and Hypotheses
Simply telling people to think positive thoughts (Teasdale, 1977) or not think 
negative thoughts (Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994) are techniques that are ineffective. The 
current study was designed to test the hypothesis that positive thoughts will become more 
accessible when the thoughts are subjected to a period of thought suppression under 
conditions of high cognitive load.
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First, it was hypothesized that people experiencing a sad mood will produce 
paradoxical effects during attempted suppression tasks. Depressed individuals who 
attempt to suppress positive material will actually remember a greater amount of positive 
material, while those who attempt to suppress negative material will actually recall a 
greater amount of negative material.
Second, greater amounts of cognitive load were hypothesized to further increase 
the inefficiency of suppression attempts. Thus, individuals under conditions of high 
cognitive load should have greater paradoxical effects than those with low cognitive load.
The greatest differences should be seen between those individuals that attempt to 
suppress positive material while under a high cognitive load and those that attempt to 
suppress negative material while under a high cognitive load. Positive suppression and 
high cognitive load should lead to the greatest recall of positive words, while negative 
suppression and high cognitive load should lead to the greatest recall of negative words.
Evidence of the effects of cognitive load should also be seen in the number of 
times that individuals report thinking about the to-be-suppressed material. People who 
experience high cognitive load should have more failures during the suppression period 
than those who experience low cognitive load.
CHAPTER II
METHODS
Participants
This experiment was conducted using 180 University of North Dakota psychology 
students (48 men and 132 women). This group emerged after screening 278 students for 
eligibility in the experiment. Thirty-two students were excluded due to pre-existing 
“probable” depression as measured by the Geriatric Depression Scale - Short Form 
(Seibert, & Ellis, 1991). Another 56 students were excluded because they failed to show a 
change in mood following the mood induction technique. Such failure rates are quite 
common in mood induction studies (Martin, 1990). Finally, seven students were excluded 
because they were unable to correctly recall the load number. Participants received extra 
credit for their participation. For means, standard deviations, and ranges of both 
demographic, questionnaire, and dependent data, please see Appendix A.
Design and Procedure
Prior to the actual experiment, participants were given a series of questionnaires 
in a counterbalanced order. These questionnaires included the Symbol Search Subtest of 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults - Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981), the 
Geriatric Depression Scale - Short Form (GDS-SF; Ferraro & Chelminski, 1996), the 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells, & Davies, 1994), the White Bear
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Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner, & Zanakos, 1994), and the Vividness of Visual 
Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). They were also asked to provide 
information concerning their ages, genders, and current use of medications. Participants 
gave pennission to obtain the American College Testing (ACT) Mathematics subtest 
scores (from the University of North Dakota Registrar’s Office) because this score has 
been implicated as a moderator variable for whether a person shows the rebound effect 
(Rutledge, Hoolenberg, & Hancock, 1993). With the exception o f the ACT and WAIS-R 
subtests, please see Appendix B for questionnaire items. As a baseline for recall ability, 
all participants were administered the WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest as the first task. After 
all of the above measures were completed (a period of approximately ten minutes), 
participants were given two minutes to free-recall as many of the vocabulary words as 
they could.
Using the mood induction technique described in Seibert and Ellis (1991; see also 
Gunther, et al, 1996), participants were given an induced mood of sadness (see Appendix 
C). As a manipulation check, the Depression Adjective Checklist (Lubin, 1967) was 
administered after mood induction (see Appendix B). Then participants were asked to 
visualize a white bear and a brown rabbit (which animal was visualized first was 
counterbalanced). The following instructions were given for each visualization:
Please close your eyes and imagine a _________ . Try to get as vivid a
picture as you can of th e__________. Pretend that you are preparing to
tell a friend exactly what you are now seeing. Please spend the next 30
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seconds thinking about the image you have created and try to observe as 
much detail about the image as you can.
After the participant had one minute to consider both images, the participant was 
given the following instructions:
Now, you are going to receive a series of cards with words that describe 
how one of the animals you have just visualized feels. You will receive a 
card every 20 seconds. With each card, pretend that you are the animal that 
you have visualized and try to feel the feeling on the card. Try to absorb 
yourself in the feeling as much as you can.
The adjectives that were used were taken from Denny and Hunt (1992). These 
words have been used in several memory experiments and are recognized as appropriately 
valenced (Kuiper, Derry, & MacDonald, 1982). The words are displayed in Appendix D. 
There are 14 positive adjectives and 14 negative adjectives. Half of the participants 
received pairings of the white bear with positive statements and pairings of the brown 
rabbit with negative statements, and the pairings were reversed for the other half of the 
participants. Adjectives were presented in a standardized random order for all 
participants. However, positive and negative statements were interspersed (pseudo- 
randomly) in such a way that each valenced adjective was followed by an adjective of the 
opposite valence.
In the next phase, participants were ' ed to either not think of the animal 
associated with the negative items, not think of the animal associated with the positive 
items, or not think of a “vehicle.” Participants were also assigned to either high (memory
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of a seven-digit number) or low (memory of a two-digit number) cognitive load. Thus the 
experimental design is a 3 (positive suppression, negative suppression, or no suppression) 
x 2 (high cognitive load or low cognitive load) between-subjects factorial design. Please 
see Table 1 for a schematic of group membership.
Table 1: Schematic o f Groups
SUPPRESSION COGNITIVE LOAD
Positive animal 1. High, memory of 7-digit number
2. Low, memory of a 2-digit number
Negative animal 3. High, memory of a 7-digit number
4. Low, memory of a 2-digit number
No suppression 5. High, memory of a 7-digit number
6. Low, memory of a 2-digit number
The following instructions were given to thought-suppressing individuals. (These 
instruction^ ,h  loosely based on instructions from Zeitlin, Netten, & Hodder, 1995): 
Now, I want you to spend the next five minutes thinking about 
whatever you want. I want you to try not to think about the image of a 
___________ . Try to distract yourself with thoughts about the things you
see in this room.
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You may find it difficult to keep the image out of your mind. Each 
time the image appears in your mind, please push the counter in front of
you.
In a moment, you will receive a number from the research 
assistant. It is very important that you remember this number at the end of 
the five minute period. If you are unable to recall the number accurately, 
your data cannot be used.
Remember, during the following five minutes, try to not think of
__________ , keep track of the number of times you do think of the image,
and remember the number you are given. Please let the research assistant 
know when you are ready to begin.
Non-suppressing individuals were given the following instructions:
Now, I want you to spend the next five minutes thinking about 
whatever you want. However, each time you think about a ‘vehicle’, 
please push the counter in front of you.
In a moment, you will receive a number from the research 
assistant. It is very important that you remember this number at the end of 
five minutes. If you are unable to recall the number accurately, your data 
cannot be used.
Remember, during the following five minutes, think about 
whatever you want, keep track of the number of times you think of a 
vehicle, and remember the number you are given.
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All groups were given a thought monitoring task. However, the control group kept 
track of a thought that is unrelated to the valenced words, while experimental participants 
were asked to monitor the thoughts of an image that is being suppressed. A hand-held 
counter was given to each participant so that they could record the times that they thought 
about the to-be-suppressed item.
In the final phase of the experiment, participants were asked to simply recall as 
many of the previously memorized words as possible. Participants filled out an alternate 
form of the Depression Adjective Checklist (forms A and B were alternated as pre- and 
post-experimental measures). Gunther, et al. (1996) have shown that this mood induction 
should be effective for approximately 20 minutes, as have others (Frost & Green, 1982; 
Isen & Gorgoloine, 1983).
This experiment involved two major precautions in order to insure the continued 
well-being of subjects. First, GDS-SF scores were calculated before any mood 
manipulation. If the score indicated the slightest possibility of a preexisting depressed 
state (a score of five or higher, out of a possible 15), the participant was told his or her 
score, alerted to its possible meaning as well as its inconclusiveness, and given 
information concerning the University of North Dakota Counseling Center and 
Psychological Services Center. For those participants who did complete the mood 
induction, they were required to complete a shortened, happy mood induction found in 
Appendix C. In this way, no naturally-occurring depressed participants were allowed to 
participate. Also, given the known effects of the happy mood induction, those who did
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participate, were likely to leave the session in a better mood than when they first arrived 
to the experimental session (Seibert & Ellis, 1991).
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Unless otherwise specified, the alpha level for significance will be set at p < .05.
ANOVAs were conducted in order to assure that groups did not differ 
significantly across gender, age, year in college, health, mood, verbal ability, or scores on 
questionnaires. Please see Appendix F for related ANOVA source tables. Correlations 
between demographic information and the various questionnaires can be found in 
Appendix G. Appendix H shows the correlations between questionnaire data and the 
dependent variables.
A series of two-way ANOVAs and ANCOVAs w'ere performed on each of the 
dependent variables: 1. number of positive adjectives recalled (PLUS), 2. number of 
negative adjectives recalled (NEG), 3. the difference scores between positive and 
negative adjectives remembered (PL-NG), 4. the number of reported intrusions during 
suppression period (INTRUSIONS), and 5. the ending mood score on the final DACL 
(MOOD3). (Remember that DACL forms A and B were used with half the participants 
receiving A before B and the other half receiving B before A.) All of the source tables for 
the following analyses can be found in Appendix I.
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ANCOVA for PLUS
Both for theoretical and statistical reasons, it was decided to conduct the analysis 
using the number of WAIS-R vocabulary words recalled (WAISRECALL) as a covariate. 
First, the WAISRECALL measure serves as a baseline for general memory ability and is 
likely to explain some of the error variance in a subsequent memory task. Secondly, 
WAISRECALL and PLUS are positively correlated (r = .31,p = .00).
The main effect for suppression group was significant, F (2,173) = 3.18, p = .04. 
Since three a priori hypotheses were being tested, the Fisher’s Least Significant 
Difference test (Fisher, 1970) was used for testing the statistical significance of simple 
effects. Both the positive suppression group (adjusted M = 3.72, SD = 0.23) and control 
group (adjusted M = 3.72, SD = 0.23) recalled significantly more positive adjectives than 
the negative suppression group (adjusted M = 3.03, SD = 0.23, p = .03) The effect size 
was moderate (eta squared = .04). Please see Table 2 for observed and covariate-adjusted 
means and standard deviations. Both the main effect for memory load and the interaction 
were not significant [F (1, 173) = 0.23, p = .64 and F (2, 173) = 0.14, p = .87, 
respectively].
Table 2. Observed and Estimated Means and Standard Deviations for PLUS by Types of 
Suppression
Suppression Type Obs. M (Est. M) Obs. STD (Est. STD)
Positive 3.78 (3.72) 1.93 (0.23)*
Negative 2.97 (3.03) 1.38 (0.23)*
Neutral 3.72 (3.72) 2.05 (0.23)*
* Given the way that an ANCOVA adjusts the dependent variable according to variance 
in the covariate, the standard deviation ends up the same for all groups.
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ANCOVA for NEG
Once again, WAISRECALL was chosen as a covariate in order to account for 
baseline memory ability and because of its correlation with NEG (r = .36, p < .001). Both 
main effects and the interaction were not significant [suppression type: F (2,173) = 0.90, 
P =.41; memory load: F (1, 173) = 0.05, p = .83; interaction: F (2, 173) = 2.09, p = .13].
ANOVA for PL-NG
Since the effects of baseline memory were expected to cancel each other out and 
no correlation exists between WAISRECALL and PL-NG (r < .01, p = .99), a two-way 
ANOVA was used in this analysis. Both the main effects and the interaction were not 
significant [suppression type: F (2, 174) = 1.98, p = .14; memory load: F (1, 174) = 0.09, 
P = .77; interaction F (2, 174) = 1.37, p = .26].
Since previous research has suggested that the rebound effect may be stronger in 
people with high visual-spatial math skill ability (Rutledge, Hoolenberg, & Hancock, 
1993), another analysis was conducted with participants who had the highest scores on 
the WAIS-R Digit Symbol subtest. Separate rankings on digit symbol scores were 
conducted within each of the six original groups. Next, the top 20 ranks in each group 
were selected. This process selected only those individuals who achieved scores greater 
than the 60th percentile relative to the normal population (Wechsler, 1981). The resulting 
groups were not significantly different on Digit Symbol scores, F (5, 110) = 1.16, p  = .33. 
Please see Table 3 for the means, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum
values found in each group.
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Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Minimum and Maximum Scores on Digit 
Symbol
Group # Mean SD Min Max
1 77.65 8.36 65 90
2 76.90 9.07 66 93
3 77.50 4.97 69 91
4 77.95 9.08 65 97
5 77.70 7.62 70 93
6 78.40 7.20 69 93
TOTAL 77.68 7.69 65 97
While results showed no significant main effects [suppression type: F (2, 114) = 
2.50, p = .09; memory load: F (1, 114) = 0.17, p = .68], the interaction emerged as 
marginally significant [F (2, 114) = 2.91, p = .06]. The effect size was moderate (eta 
squared = .05). Please see means and standard deviations of the various cells as displayed 
in Table 4.
Table 4. Means and Standard Deviations for PL-NGs of the High Digit Symbol Sample
Group # Suppression Memory Load N Mean SD
1 Positive High 20 1.25 2.15
2 Low 20 0.30 1.69
3 Negative High 20 0.20 1.32
4 Low 20 0.70 1.84
5 Neutral High 20 0.90 1.92
6 Low 20 1.75 1.59
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Low L o a d --------- - High Load
Figure 1. Interaction for high Digit Symbol analysis (positive adjectives minus negative 
adjectives).
Inspection of the plot in Figure 1 suggests that memory load may differentially 
effect PL-NG depending on the type of suppression. For a more detailed, exploratory 
analysis of the pairwise comparisons, please refer to Appendix J.
ANOVA for Intrusions During Suppression Period
Given severe violations of normality (skewness = 3.72, kurtosis = 19.43), the 
variable representing the number of reported intrusions (of the to-be-suppressed thought) 
was transformed using the square root of each case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). The 
resulting variable was then used in a two-way ANOVA considering the effects of memory 
load and suppression type.
The main effect for memory load was statistically significant [F (1, 174) = 5.84,
E < .01]. Participants with low memory load instructions tended to report a greater
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number of intrusions than participants with high memory load instructions (eta squared = 
.06).
The main effect for suppression type was also significant [F (2, 174) = 5.68,
2 = .02], and eta squared was .03. Given the fact that observations went against the 
current hypothesis, the Bonferroni Inequality method of controlling family-wise error was 
used (Stevens, 1992). It was found that the neutral suppression group reported more 
intrusions than either the positive or negative suppression groups (p < .01 and p = .03, 
respectively).
ANCOVA for Final Mood
The DACL score collected immediately following the mood induction (MOOD2) 
was used as a covariate in this analysis because it represented the level of impact that the 
mood manipulation had on each individual. (Remember that DACL forms A and B were 
used with half the participants receiving A before B and the other half receiving B before 
A). However it should be noted that the correlation level between MOOD2 and the final 
mood (MOOD3) was quite small (r = .19, p = .01) and is likely to statistically detract 
from any effect, should there be one present. The two-way ANCOVA yielded no 
significant effects [suppression type: F (2, 173) = 0.82, p =.44; memory load: F (1, 173) = 
0.40, p = 53; interaction: F (2, 173) = 1.67, p = .19].
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The current research adds further credence to the theory of ironic processes. 
Despite the fact that all participants were equally primed with a negative mood induction, 
the positive suppression group remembered more positively-valenced words than the 
negative suppression group (approximately one extra word). The experimental design 
also allows consideration o f a most intriguing concept: the ironic effects of thought 
suppression appear to spread to other related concepts. Thus, even though the negative 
suppression group was attempting to not think about the animal paired with negative 
adjectives, the result on the dependent variable was a decreased availability of the 
positive adjectives.
Since the positive suppression group and the neutral suppression group were 
approximately equal in the number of positive adjectives recalled, two possibilities exist. 
First, it may be that there really is no difference between trying to suppress positively- 
valenced material and trying to suppress unrelated material. A second possibility is that 
both tasks assisted participants in remembering positive words, but each group was 
assisted through a different mechanism. For instance, the positive suppression group may 
have experienced the rebound effect following the suppression period. Meanwhile, the 
neutral suppression group may have allocated more attention to the experimental stimuli 
upon being given a novel instruction (i.e., to not think about a “vehicle”). Novel or
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unexpected material often engenders greater attentional efforts (Ashcraft, 1994). This 
may have sparked a series of thoughts and memories concerning the experiment and 
increased processing of the previously presented words.
Although it had been hypothesized that negative words would be remembered 
better by the negative suppression group, there were no significant differences among the 
groups on this measure. Once again, two possibilities should be considered. It could be 
that suppression of negatively-valenced information has no impact on later recall.
Another alternative is that the mood induction created a mood-congruent memory effect 
that resulted in a ceiling effect in the memory for negative adjectives. Thus, perhaps each 
individual was primed to recall the greatest number of negative adjectives regardless of 
other interventions. Although no convincing evidence exists to support the hypothesis of 
a ceiling effect, the total number of words remembered was fairly consistent across 
conditions, thus suggesting a limited recall capacity. In addition, the participants that did 
not respond to the mood induction, showed no difference in the total number of words 
recalled (M = 5.91, SD = 2.89, minimum = 1, maximum = 16) in comparison to mood- 
induced participants (M = 6.04, SD = 2.24, minimum = 1, maximum = 13), F (1, 237) = 
.09, e  = .76.
Analyses indicate that the experimental manipulations did not produce differences 
among the groups on the DACL measure taken at the end of the experiment. This is not 
surprising given that the negative mood induction used here has a short-lived effect. 
Participants’ moods were likely to have drifted back to near baseline levels by the time 
the final mood rating was taken. Also, there is some evidence that the emotional 
processing or suppression of information may not have immediate mood impacts, despite
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the fact that mood has been shown to be altered in follow-up assessments 24-hours later 
(Hunt, 1998; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994).
Perhaps the most surprising effects found in this experiment were those 
surrounding participants’ reported intrusions. Completely counter to the original 
hypotheses, the low memory load participants reported more intrusions than the high 
memory load participants, and the neutral suppression participants reported more 
intrusions than participants suppressing emotionally-laden adjectives. Incidental reports 
from participants suggested that the high memory load task served as a distraction in-and- 
of-itself, while low memory load participants did not have their working memories filled 
with a memory rehearsal task. In returning to Wegner and Erber’s (1992) original set of 
studies using memory for digit strings as a load manipulation, it should be noted that the 
load was imposed during a period of dual encoding and behavioral response. Thus, 
memory load may increase the effect of ironic processes when used in conjunction with 
an encoding task but have no effect when used during memory' consolidation or incidental 
rehearsal.
Previous research has suggested that it is more difficult to suppress emotional 
information (Edwards & Bryan, 1997; Wegner & Gold, 1992.) However, in the present 
study, the neutral suppression group reported a greater number of intrusions during the 
suppression period. One possible explanation for this is that the instructions to not think 
about a “vehicle” were particularly novel and unexpected. If the instruction was seen as 
unique and striking, this may have made it even more difficult to not think about it. 
Participants may have responded by allocating greater attention to the events in the 
experiment. Perhaps, participants instructed to suppress neutral information were more
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likely to distract themselves with thoughts of the adjectives, despite the instruction to use 
items seen in the experimental room as distractors.
Considering the specific variables that correlated with the number of intrusions 
leads to some intriguing possibilities. These correlations were also different depending 
on the group membership (see again, Appendix H). In the positive suppression group, a 
greater number of intrusions was associated with higher self-reports of physical health (r 
= .29, p = .02). This was not true in the negative suppression or neutral suppression 
groups (r = .06, p = .67 and -.06, p = .69, respectively). Thus, it would appear that people 
who showed more difficulty suppressing positive information tended to perceive 
themselves as healthier than those who were highly successful at suppressing positive 
information. However, the White Bear Suppression Inventory, a measure of people’s 
difficultv suppressing unpleasant thoughts, was associated with poorer health (r = -.15, p 
= .04). This suggests that suppressing positive information may be a skill that is 
independent of suppressing negative information.
The positive suppression group was also unique in that low scores on the 
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire were associated with more intrusions 
(r = .27, p = .03), while negative and neutral suppression revealed no such relationships 
(r < - .01, p =.98 and - .16, p = .22, respectively). Thus, poorer ability to visualize relates to 
increased positive intrusions but not increases in negative or neutral intrusions.
Of particular interest was the relationship between intrusions and final mood 
found in the negative suppression group. Members of this group should have been the 
most similar to depressed individuals that are trying to not think about negative thoughts. 
Each intrusion would equal a failure, and it is hypothesized that such failure would
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eventually have an impact on mood. In the current experiment, the negative suppression 
group was unique in that there was a negative correlation between number of intrusions 
and final mood score (r = -.36, p < .01), whereas the relationship for the positive and 
neutral groups was not significant (r = -.06, p = .65 and -.13, p = .33, respectively).
The most promising results from this experiment are those indicating that 
participants who scored high on Digit Symbol perfonnance may represent a subset of the 
population that responds differently to the current experimental demands. Although the 
initial analysis of the positive adjectives minus the negative adjectives (PL-NG) showed 
no significant results, a subsequent analysis which used only two-thirds of the data, 
yielded a marginally significant interaction (p < .06). Thus, despite a loss of power, the 
effect was suggested when considering participants with Digit Symbol scores above the 
60th percentile (in reference to normal population samples). Low memory load was 
associated with the greatest difference in memory for positive adjectives minus negative 
adjectives in the neutral suppression condition. Also, the positive suppression group had a 
marginally greater PL-NG mean than the negative suppression group when compared 
across high cognitive load (p = .07). In other words, the data suggests that both high load, 
positive suppression and low load, neutral suppression groups remembered more positive 
than negative words in comparison to the high load, negative suppression group. Thus, 
telling sadness-induced participants to not think of a positive icon may be better than 
telling them to not think of a negative icon.
This result is significant because it shows, that under the right conditions and with 
the appropriate subgroup, counterintuitive instructions may skew people’s memories 
toward more positive retrievals. Even in this study, the association between mood and
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memory is shown in the positive correlation between PL-NG and participants’ final 
moods (r = .19, p =  .01).
One weakness in the current study is that it was assumed that only mood- 
congruent memory effects would be operating. However, Rinck, Glowalla, and Schneider 
(1992) have shown that mood-incongruent effects sometimes occur. In their experiment, 
words that were rated by participants as being “very” pleasant or unpleasant were subject 
to a mood-congruent memory effect. However, words that were rated as only “slightly” 
pleasant or unpleasant were subject to a mood-incongruent effect (individuals 
experiencing an induced mood of sadness during encoding remembered more slightly 
positive words while individuals experiencing induced mood of elation remembered more 
slightly negative words). The authors explained this effect as a result of increased 
elaboration. For instance, participants who were in an induced mood of sadness required 
additional time to recognize a word as pleasant when it was only slightly pleasant. This 
led to additional processing and greater accessibility during recall. In the future, it is 
suggested that researchers take into consideration the level of valence as well as the 
direction, since slightly valenced words may actually result in mood-incongruent memory 
bias.
In the short run, the effect may account for an impractically small amount of the 
variance (eta squared = .05). However, this study does not consider cumulative effects 
over time. Consider a treatment in which depressed individuals would be asked to bring 
in a number of items from their home that have significant, unchanging, positive 
memories (i.e., family pictures, etc.). What might happen if the client was asked to 
engage in periods of thought suppression for these items? If the items were sysfematically
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moved around the client’s home, the objects could become associated with numerous 
other items. This may increase the likelihood that the client would “fail” during 
suppression and have intrusions of the positively related memories.
Although such an intervention is still in the realm of experimental development, 
clinical psychologists should already be ready to entertain the idea of ironic treatments: 
One possible direction . . .  is to include training procedures to modify 
biases that patients cannot control, even when made aware of them . . . .  
effortful control eventually fails because it depends on capacity-limited 
resources. In this light, what is required is to automate the processes that 
oppose the selective intake of negative information, in order to reduce the 
load placed on vulnerable individuals when under stress (Mathews, 1997,
p. 62).
....deal Implications
Clinical implications are limited at this time, but several tentative suggestions can 
be offered. First, the current research adds to the steadily-growing body of research that 
counterindicates thought suppression as a technique for dealing with cyclical depressive 
thoughts. At best, it is a short-term fix that only briefly circumvents entrenched negative 
schemas. At worst, as in group three presently, positive information becomes increasingly 
less available as negative intrusions become associated with an increasing number of 
environmental stimuli.
A second suggestion is that if distraction techniques are employed, they should be 
done so when cognitive load is at (or near) its lowest point possible. Group six was the 
group with the highest proportion o f positive to negative words recalled (although not
40
significantly greater than groups one, three, or five), thus “benefitting” from suppressing 
the thought of a neutral stimulus. Such neutral distraction was successful when cognitive 
load was low, but less successful when cognitive load was high.
Third, while other screening techniques will no doubt be developed (also see 
Rutledge, Hancock, & Rutledge, 1996), administering the Digit Symbol task to depressed 
clients may assist in making decisions about whether or not to assign homework that 
could elicit the rebound effect. The current author suggests that a Digit Symbol raw score 
of 70 be used as a cut off when false positives are less problematic than false negatives.
Fourth, this research lends initial support to paradoxical techniques as debuggers 
of malfunctioning cognitive systems. When clients are prescribed symptoms, the 
automatic search is for failures at being symptomatic. However, paradoxically inclined 
therapists may want to consider the wording of their prescriptions more closely in order to 
ensure that the automatic search is for positive behavior or thoughts rather than failures at 
being sick. This may strengthen the effects that have already been observed. In addition, 
paradoxical psychologists should closely follow emerging data on predicting rebounders. 
Non-rebounders may be poor candidates for paradoxical interventions.
Final Thoughts
Obviously, more research is needed before considering whether a new paradoxical 
treatment could be both effective and additive in conjunction with current approaches to 
treating depressed states. First, research should be conducted using participants 
experiencing naturally-occurring, mildly-depressed states. While mood induction 
techniques allow for safe study of effects over a short period of time, it is difficult to 
develop analogues for mild depression over a period of hours, days, or weeks.
41
Second, different distraction techniques should be compared. In the current study, 
participants were asked to use thoughts about objects in the room to distract themselves. 
However, other kinds of tasks may be more helpful, such as counting or vigilance tasks.
Third, other variables should be included in selecting participants that are likely to 
benefit from a paradoxical treatment. For instance, Kelly and Nauta (1997) have shown 
that participants with higher levels of psychological reactance are more likely to show the 
rebound effect than those who are low in reactance. Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders, and 
Yesenosky (1994) have demonstrated a number of correlates with reactance including:
(a) lower interest in making good impressions on others, (b) less concern with meeting 
obligations or adhering to rules, (c) higher concern for future events, and (d) greater 
tendency to show strong emotional reactions. Future research should continue to carefully 
measure reactance and visual memory skills, as well as other possible moderating 
variables.
Rutledge, Hancock, and Rutledge (1996) have suggested a number of variables 
that may identify thought rebounders from non-rebounders. Most surprising, is their 
finding that 30% or fewer of the population is likely to respond with thought rebounding 
following suppression. People who are likely to show the rebound effect may have higher 
ACT composite scores, lower tendency toward obsessionality, and lower trait anxiety. 
Initial evidence suggests that Caucasians are more likely to show the effect than African- 
Americans. Females in their study were more likely to show a rebound effect, as well. 
However, men with more thought intrusions during suppression were more likely to show 
the rebound effect, despite the fact that the number of intrusions had no relationship to 
rebounding in women. These are intriguing relationships which warrant further research.
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One difficulty with the present research was that there was no way to know when 
a memory ceiling had been reached. In the future, it is suggested that researchers gather 
preliminary data about memory for target materials using participants that have had no 
mood induction. In that way, when there are no differences between a valenced 
suppression group and a neutral suppression group, it will be possible to know whether 
the approximate equality is due to statistical floor effects or the truth of the null 
hypothesis.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the current research suggests that when certain individuals are 
under conditions of high cognitive load, not thinking about positive elements increases 
the later accessibility of those elements in memory. Future research should focus on 
studying groups who are high in visual-spatial math skills and psychological reactance. 
Also, selecting naturally-occurring, mildly-depressed participants and using suppression 
material that is participant-generated, would increase external validity in future studies. 
Finally, other techniques should be used in order to determine the best way of controlling 
cognitive load. Regardless of whether the effect described in the current experiment will 
someday be tapped as a paradoxical treatment for certain subgroups, it is hoped that 
people will not so lightly tread down the path of attempted thought suppression unless 
they are prepared to face the very thing intended to be left behind.
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APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHIC AND QUESTIONNAIRE INFORMATION 
Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, And Frequencies For Demographics and
Questionnaires
Variable Sample (N=105 unless otherwise specified)
Gender Males 48
Females 135
Age (years) Mean 22.60
Standard Deviation 4.70
Range 18-43
Year in College First Year 44
Second Year 52
Third Year 49
Fourth Year 35
Not Specified 3
Health (1 = excellent; 5 = poor) Mean 2.33
Standard Deviation 0.75
Range 1-4
Mood (if > 4, excluded from study) Mean 1.07
Standard Deviation 1.18
Range 0-4
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale -
Revised Mean 48.12
Vocabulary Subtest Standard Deviation 10.45
Range 22-69
Mean 72.88
Digit Symbol Subtest Standard Deviation 10.65
Range 43-97
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Table #5 continued,
American College Testing (ACT) Mean 23.28
Mathematics Subtest Score Standard Deviation 3.98
(N=106) Range 14-33
Vividness of Visual Imagery Mean 64.96
Questionnaire Standard Deviation 20.50
Range 32-
150
White Bear Suppression Inventory Mean 44.68
Standard Deviation 10.30
Range 15-69
Thought Control Questionnaire
Distraction Mean 16.24
Standard Deviation 2.84
Range 9-24
Reappraisal Mean 14.92
Standard Deviation 3.22
Range 6-24
Social Mean 15.33
Standard Deviation 3.76
Range 6-24
Worry Mean 9.69
Standard Deviation 2.32
R.ange 6-17
Punishment Mean 8.60
Standard Deviation 2.16
Range 6-17
TOTAL Mean 64.78
Standard Deviation 7.33
Range 34-82
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Table #5, continued,
Recall of WAIS-R Vocabulary Words
Correct Words Mean 6.78
Standard Deviation 3.44
Range 0-20
Intrusions Mean 0.51
Standard Deviation 0.84
Range 0-5
Depression Adjective Check List 
(negative number represents more 
negative adjectives than positive)
After Mood Induction Mean -6.58
Standard Deviation 4.66
Range -22-0
Post-experiment Mean 0.76
Standard Deviation 4.31
Range -14-10
Reported Intrusions of
Suppressed Thought Mean 5.75
Standard Deviation 6.99
Range 0-57
Positive Adjectives Recalled Mean 3.50
Standard Deviation 1.83
Range 0-9
Negative Adjectives Recalled Mean 2.69
Standard Deviation 1.57
Range 0-8
(Positive - Negative) Adjectives Mean 0.80
Recalled Standard Deviation 1.57
Range 3-6
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRES
Included in this appendix are copies of the questions from the pencil and paper 
measures.
(a) Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ)
(b) Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ)
(c) White Bear Suppression Inventory
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Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIO)
Directions: Using the rating scale below, rate the image conjured up for each of the 
described images. Please make one rating that describes the vividness of your 
visualization once with your eyes open and once with your eyes closed.
Rating Description:
1 “Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision”
2 “Clear and reasonably vivid”
3 “Moderately clear and vivid”
4 “Vague and dim”
5 “No image at all, you only ‘know’ that you are thinking of the object”
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not 
with you at present) and consider carefully the piture that comes before your mind’s eye.
1. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body.
2. Characteristic poses of the head, attitudes of the body, etc.
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking.
4. The different colours worn in some familar clothes.
Visualize a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind’s eye.
5. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky.
6. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness.
7. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightning.
8. A rainbow appears.
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Think of the front of a shop you often go to. Consider the pictures that come before your 
mind.
9. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the road.
10. A window display including the colours, shapes and details of the door.
11. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details of the door.
12. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant serves you. 
Money changes hands.
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and a lake. Consider the 
picture that comes before your mind’s eye.
13. The contours of the landscape.
14. The colour and shape of the trees.
15. The colour and shape of the lake.
16. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves.
(Marks, 1974)
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Directions: Most people experience unpleasant, and/or unwanted thoughts (in verbal 
and/or picture form), which can be difficult to control. We are interested in the techniques 
that you generally use to control such thoughts. Below are a number of things that people 
do to control these thoughts. Please read each statement carefully, and indicate how often 
you use each technique by circling the appropriate number. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time thinking about each one.
Response format: 1 = never; 2 = sometimes; 3 = often; 4 = almost always 
When I experience an unpleasant/unwanted thought:
1. I call to mind positive images instead.
2. I tell myself not to be so stupid.
3. I focus on the thought.
4. I replace the thought with a more trivial bad thought.
5. I don’t talk about the thought to anyone.
6. I punish myself for thinking the thought.
7. I dwell on other worries.
8. I keep the thought to myself.
9. 1 occupy myself with work instead.
10.1 challenge the thought’s validity.
11 .1 get angry at myself for having the thought.
12.1 avoid discussing the thought.
Appendix B, continued
Thought Control Questionnaire
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13.1 shout at myself for having the thought.
14.1 analyze the thought rationally.
15.1 slap or pinch myself to stop the thought.
16.1 think pleasant thoughts instead.
17 .1 find out how my friends deal with these thoughts.
18.1 worry about more minor things instead.
19 .1 do something that I enjoy.
2 0 .1 try to reinterpret the thought.
21.1 think about something else.
2 2 .1 think more about the minor problems I have.
2 3 .1 try a different way of thinking about it.
2 4 .1 think about past worries instead.
2 5 .1 ask my friends if they have similar thoughts.
2 6 .1 focus on different negative thoughts.
2 7 .1 question the reasons for having the thought.
2 8 .1 tell myself that something bad will happen if I think the thought.
2 9 .1 talk to a friend about the thought.
3 0 .1 keep myself busy.
Appendix B, continued
(Wells & Davies, 1994)
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White Bear Suppression Inventory
Directions: Please circle a number indicating how true the following statements are of 
yourself. Response format: 1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = not sure; 4 = disagree;
5 = strongly disagree
1. There are things I prefer not to think about.
2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do.
3 .1 have thoughts that I cannot stop.
4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot erase.
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea.
6 .1 wish I could stop thinking of certain things.
7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could stop it.
8 .1 always try to put problems out of mind.
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head.
10. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from intruding on my mind.
11. There are things that I try not to think about.
12. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking.
13.1 often do things to distract myself from my thoughts.
14 .1 have thoughts that I try to avoid.
15. There are many thoughts that I have that I don’t tell anyone.
Appendix B, continued
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APPENDIX C
MOOD INDUCTION TECHNIQUE 
Directions
1.1 will read each of the following cards to myself and then I will read the card
aloud.
2. In this part of the experiment, I will be reading series of cards with statements 
typed on them. These statements represent a mood state. In order to participate fully and 
successfully, I will need to be willing to feel and experience each statement as it would 
apply to me personally. In other words, when I read each statement, I will allow myself to 
respond as though the statement had been my own original thought. I will go with the 
feeling and not try to stop it.
3. At first I might feel like resisting the mood. However, I will see that is the case 
that I have the opportunity to learn to talk myself into a mood, and obviously, I will also 
learn how to talk myself out of one. When this happens I will find that I have learned 
something valuable about myself; I can learn to control my moods. Thus, I will try to 
experience the mood suggested.
4 .1 will feel each item, making the statement my own. I will experience the mood 
suggested and will not attempt to stop it. I will visualize a scene in which I have had such 
a feeling or thought. Then I will begin to say whatever comes to my mind that relates to
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the feeling. This is a type of free association - letting thoughts that pertain to the feeling 
flow freely.
5 .1 am now ready to experience the statements that follow. From this point 
forward whenever I hear the tone, I will go on to the next page. I will spend the time 
between tones reading the statements and experiencing the feelings they suggest to me. I 
am ready to begin.
Sad Mood Induction Scale
1.1 feel a little down today.
2. My classes are harder than I expected.
3. Everyone else seems to be having more fun.
4. Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can’t sleep.
5 .1 wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am.
6. Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong.
7 .1 doubt that I’ll ever make a contribution in the world.
8. 1 feel like my life’s in a rut that I’m never going to get out of.
9. My mistakes haunt me, I’ve made too many.
10. Life is such a heavy burden.
11. I ’m tired of trying.
12. Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn’t seem to be good enough.
13. Nobody understands me or even tries to.
14 .1 don’t think things are ever going to get better.
15.1 feel worthless.
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16. What’s the point of trying?
17. My parents don’t know who I am.
18. When 1 talk no one really listens.
19.1 feel cheated by life.
20. Why should I try when I can’t make a difference anyway?
21. Sometimes I feel really guilty about the way I’ve treated my parents.
22. Every time I turn around, something else has gone wrong.
23. I’m completely alone.
24. There is hope.
2 5 .1 feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes. 
Happy Mood Induction Scale
1. When I have the right attitude, nothing can depress me.
2. Most people like me.
3. I’ve got some good friends.
4 .1 can make things happen.
5. 1 feel creative.
6.1 can make any situation turn out right.
7. I’m in charge of my life and I like it that way.
8. 1 know I can do it; I’m going to seize the day.
9. I’m energized.
10. It’s great to be alive.
(Seibert & Ellis, 1991)
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APPENDIX D
STIMULUS WORDS
Table 6. Stimulus Words for Memory Task.
(Numbers in parentheses are written frequencies according to Francis and Kucera, 1982).
Negative Positive
guilty (3) jealous (4) sociable (l) amiable (2)
withdrawn (4) inferior (7) playful (3) kindness (6)
anguish (8) dismal (8) gracious (9) cheerful (10)
defeated (10) depressed (10) advancement (11) energetic (11)
bitterness (18) despair (20) delighted (15) loyalty (18)
troubled (23) lonely (25) orderly (19) exciting (27)
inadequate (32) emnty (64) helpful (29) capable (66)
MEANS (16.86) (16.21)
SD (16.26) (16.71)
Note: With alpha set at .05 (two-tailed), the two groups do not differ significantly on 
word frequency, t (26) = .10.
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APPENDIX E
DEPRESSION ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST 
Form A
1. Wilted 9. Unwanted 17. Strong 25. Criticized
2. Safe 10. Fine 18. Tortured 26. Grieved
3. Miserable 11. Broken-hearted 19. Listless 27. Dreamy
4. Gloomy 12. Down-cast 20. Sunny 28. Hopeless
5. Dull 13. Enthusiastic 21. Destroyed 29. Oppressed
6. Gay 14. Failure 22. Wretched 3 0 .Joyous
7. Low-spirited 15. Afflicted 23. Broken 31. Weary
8. Sad 16. Active 24. Light-hearted 32. Droopy
Form B
1. Downhearted 9. Forlorn 17. Clean 25. Morbid
2. Lively 10. Alert 18. Dispirited 26. Heavy-hearted
3. Unfeeling 11. Exhausted 19. Moody 27. Easy-going
4. Alone 12. Heartsick 20. Pleased 28. Gray
5. Unhappy 13. Bright 21. Dead 29. Melancholy
6. Alive 14. Glum 22. Sorrowful 30. Hopeful
7. Terrible 15. Desolate 23. Bleak 31. Mashed
8. Poor 16. Composed 24. Light 32. Unlucky
(Lubin, 1967)
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ANOVA SOURCE TABLES SHOWING RANDOM ASSIGNMENT ACROSS 
SUPPRESSION AND MEMORY LOAD GROUPINGS
APPENDIX F
Table 7. Gender bv Suppression Group.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 2 0.63 0.32 1.64 .20
Within subjects 180 34.78 0.19
Total 182 35.41
Table 8. Age by Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 2 10.02 5.01 0.22 .80
Within subjects 180 4118.05 22.88
Total 182 4128.08
T able .9 .,, Year.in ,Co lkgg.,by.luppres§iQ,n.G.rouj>L
Sum of Mean F F
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 2 3.51 1.75 1.57 .21
Within subjects 180 198.24 1.12
Total 182 201.75
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Table 10. Health bv Suppression Group.
Appendix F, continued
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 2 0.48 0.24 0.43 .65
Within subject 180 101.85 0.57
Total 182 102.33
Table 11. Geriatric Depression Scale bv Suppression Group-
d f
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 2 0.28 0.14 0.10 .91
Within subjects 180 247.77 1.42
Total 182 248.05
Table 12. WAIS-R Vocabulary by Suppression Group,
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 2 545.39 272.70 2.54 .08
Within subjects 180 19,313.97 107.30
Total 182 19,859.36
Table 13, White Bear Suppression Inventory by Suppression Group
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 2 83.40 41.70 0.39 .68
Within subjects 180 19,242.58 106.90
Total 182 19,325.98
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Table 14, Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire by Suppresssion Group,
Sum of Mean F F
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 1097.58 548.79 1.31 .27 
180 75,369.15 418.72 
182 76,466.73
Table 15. WAIS-R Digit Symbol bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean E E 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 114.06 57.03 0.51 .53 
180 20,519.30 112.00 
182 20,633.36
Table 16. Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ). Distraction bv Suppression Group
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 10.31 5.15 .60 .55 
180 1537.10 8.54 
182 1547.41
Table 17. TCO. Punishment bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean £  E 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 2 5.27 2.63 0.56 .57
Within subjects 180 844.82 4.69
Total 182 850.08
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Table 18. TCO, Reappraisal bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 24.64 12.23 1.19 .31 
180 1858.47 10.33 
182 1882.93
Table 19. TCP, Worry bv suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 20.26 10.13 1.89 .15 
180 964.99 5.361 
182 985.25
Table 20. TCO. Social bv Suppression Group
Sum of Mean E F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 7.17 3.58 0.25 .78 
180 2563.50 14.24 
182 2570.67
Table 21. TCP. TOTAL bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 64.11 32.05 0.59 .56 
180 9780.81 54.34 
182 9844.92
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Table 22. WAIS-R Recall 1
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bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 18.73 9.37 0.79 .46 
180 2130.52 11.84 
182 2149.56
Table 23. WAIS-R Intrusions bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean F F 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 2.41 1.21 1.82 .17 
180 119.33 0.66 
182 121.74
Table 24. First DACL. Positive Words bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean E E 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 1.18 0.59 0.85 .43 
180 125.71 0.70 
182 126.90
Table 25. First DACL, Negative Words bv Suppression Group.
Sum of Mean E E 
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 
Within subjects 
Total
2 22.48 11.24 0.59 .56 
180 3449.50 19.16 
182 3471.98
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Table 26. Gender by Memory Load.
Appendix F, continued
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.00 0.00 0.08 .90
Within subjects 181 35.41 0.20
Total 182 35.41
Table 2 1 . Age bv Memory Load.
d f
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects l 27.39 27.39 1.21 .27
Within subjects 181 4100.69 22.67
Total 182 4128.08
Table 28. Year in College bv Memory.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.12 0.12 0.11 .74
Within subjects 181 201.63 1.13
Total 182 201.75
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Table 29. Health bv Memory.______
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.14 .14 0.24 .62
Within subjects 181 102.19 0.57
Total 182 102.33
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Table 30. Geriatric Depression Scale by Memory Load-
Appendix F, continued
Sum of Mean E F
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.93 .93 0.66 .42
Within subjects 181 247.12 1.40
Total 182 248.05
Table 31. WAIS-R Vocabulary by Memory Load.
Sum of Mean F F
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob
Between subjects 1 42.68 42.68 0.39 .53
Within subjects 181 19,816.68 109.48
Total 182 19,859.36
Table 32. White Bear Suppression Inventory by Memory Load
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 369.59 369.59 3.53 .06
Within subjects 181 18,956.39 104.73
Total 182 19,325.98
Table 33. Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire by Memory Load.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 27.47 27.47 0.07 .80
Within subjects 181 76,439.27 422.32
Total 182 76,466.73
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Table 34. WAIS-R Digit Symbol bv Memory Load-
Appendix F, continued
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects 1 79.18 79.18 0.70 .41
Within subjects 181 20,554.17 113.56
Total 182 20,633.36
Table 35. TCP. Distraction by Memory Load.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects 1 9.28 9.28 1.09 .30
Within subjects 181 1538.13 8.50
Total 182 1547.41
Table 36. TCP, Punishment bv Memory Load,
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 1.62 1.62 0.35 .56
Within subjects 181 848.46 4.69
Total 182 850.08
Table 37. TCP, Reappraisal bv Memory Load
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
£
Prob.
Between subjects 1 4.22 4.22 0.41 .53
Within subjects 181 1878.71 10.39
Total 182 1882.93
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Table 38. TCO. Worrv bv 1Vlemory Load.
Sum of Mean F E
df Squares Squares Ratio Prob.
Between subjects 1 18.98 18.98 3.74 .06
Within subjects 181 912.56 5.01
Total 182 931.50
Table 39. TCP, Social bv Memory Load-
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.02 0.02 0.00 .97
Within subjects 181 2570.65 14.20
Total 182 2570.67
Table 40, TCP. Total by Memory Load-
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects l 53.13 53.13 0.98 .32
Within subjects 181 9791.79 54.10
Total 182 9844.92
Table 41. WAIS-R Recall by Memory Load.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
E
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects 1 5.83 5.83 0.4^ .48
Within subjects 181 21430.43 11.84
Total 182 2149.26
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Table 42. WAIS-R Intrusions by Memory Load-
A ppendix F, continued
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects 1 .16 .16 0.24 .62
Within subjects 181 121.57 .67
Total 182 121.74
Table 43. First DACL. Positive Words bv Memory Load-
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Between subjects 1 0.15 0.15 0.03 .87
Within subjects 181 1041.62 5.76
Total 182 1041.77
Table 44. First DACL, Negative Words by Memory Load.
df
Sum of 
Squares
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
E
Prob.
Between subjects 1 1.67 1.67 0.28 .64
Within subjects 181 1394.74 7.71
Total 182 1396.40
CORRELATIONS ACROSS DEMOGRAPHICS AND OTHER MEASURES 
Table 45. Correlations Across Demographics and Other Measures
APPENDIX G
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. AGE .35** .()3 -.07 .20** .18 .02 -.11 -.10
2. YEAR ,02 -.04 .25** .10 -.12 .15* -.00
3. HEALTH .22** -.14 -.15* .03 -.08 -.06
4. MOOD1 .05 -.29** .05 -.03 -.09
5. VOCAB .06 .00 .14 -.10
6. WBSI -.06 .04 -.04
7. VVIQ -.02 -.05
8. DIGSYM .04
9. TCQD -.01 - .05 -.09 -.10 -.03 -.05 .02
10. TCQP -.07 14 .24** -.02 -.44** .10 .04 .06
ll.T C Q R .06 .15* .15* .20 -.08 .02 .05 .04
12. TCQW -.09 17* .27** -.12 -.35** .06 .01 .05
13.TCQS -.05 - .02 -.14 .04 .09 -.10 .05 -.02
14. TCQTO -.05 13 .11 .03 -.24** -.01 .07 44**
15. W-REC .24** - .05 -.05 .19* -.02 .03 23** -.02
16. W-INT -.13 j05 .11 -.18* -.05 .04 -.25** -.02
17. ACT .13 13 .01 .36** .11 .03 .13 -.03
* = P <  .05 ** = p <.01
Please see pages 69 and 70 for explanation of abbreviations.
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Table #45, continued,
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1. AGE .11 -.09 .13 .07 .12 -.03 ■ b 4^ -.01
2. YEAR
r-o■ .06 -.09 -.05 -.05 .24** -.13 .13
3. HEALTH .14 .15* .17* -.02 .13 -.05 .05 -.11
4. MOOD1 .24 .15* 27** -.14 .11 l b .11 .01
5. VOCAB -.02 .20** -.12 .04 .03 .19* .18* .36**
6. WBSI _ 44** -.08 -.35** .09 -.24** -.02 -.05 .11
7. VVIQ .10 .02 .06 -.10 -.01 .03 .04 .03
8. DIGSYM .04 .05 .01 .05 .07 .33 -.25** .13
9. TCQD .06 .04 .05 -.02 44** -.02 -.02 -.03
10. TCQP .19** .43** -.10 49** .03 .02 -.03
ll.T C Q R .20** .09 .62** -.00 -.04 .09
12. TCQW i b -j 51** .07 .04 -.16
13.TCQS 49** -.12 .10 -.09
14. TCQTO i b 4^ .04 -.08
15. W-REC -.31** .19*
16. W-INT -.22*
17. ACT
Explanation of Abbreviations
1. AGE is how old (in years) participants were at the time of participation.
2. YEAR refers to the participant’s year in school (1 = first year, 2 = second year, etc.)
3. HEALTH is a self-report rating where "1" is excellent health and "5" is poor health.
4. MOOD1 is the Geriatric Depression Scale - Short Form. All scores are subclinical (1- 
4) with higher
scores indicating greater endorsement of depressive elements.
5. VOCAB is the WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest.
6. WBSI is the White Bear Suppression Inventory. Lower scores represent greater 
endorsement of difficulties suppressing unwanted thoughts.
7. VVIQ is the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire. Lower scores represent 
greater visual imagery ability.
8. DIGSYM is the WAIS-R Digit Symbol.
9. TCQD is the Dorry factor on the Thought Control Questionnaire. Greater scores on 
all of the TCQ factors indicate higher tendencies to rely on that technique to deal with 
unwanted thoughts.
10. TCQP is the Punishment factor o f the TCQ.
11. TCQR is the Reappraisal factor of the TCQ.
12. TCQW is the Worry factor of the TCQ.
13. TCQS is the Social factor of the TCQ.
14. TCQTO is all of the TCQ factors added together (total).
15. W-REC is the number of words correctly recalled from WAIS-R Vocabulary.
16. W-INT is the number of intrusions during WAIS-R Vocabulary recall.
17. ACT is the American College Testing Mathematics subtest.
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Table #45, continued
APPENDIX H
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AND DEMOGRAPHIC/QUESTIONNAIRE DATA 
(SEPARATED BY SUPPRESSION GROUP)
Please see pages 69 and 70 for explanation of most abbreviations. 
Table 46. Correlations with Positive Adjectives Recalled (PLUS).
Variable
Suppression Group
Positive Negative Neutral All Participants
AGE .27* .16 .15 .17*
YEAR -.07 -.02 -.04 -.02
HEALTH .03 -.06 -.11 -.04
MOOD1 .14 -.12 i o o .03
VOCAB .19 .13 .08 .16*
WBSI .01 .11 -.12 -.02
VVIQ .10 .04 .03 .05
DIGSYM .2 1 * .05 .10 .15*
TCQD .08 .27* -.24 -.01
TCQP .12 -.03 .18 .09
TCQR .29* -.04 .11 .17*
TCQW .00 -.23 .08 -.01
TCQS .18 .02 .02 .06
* = p <.05 ** =2 <.01
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Table #46, continued
Suppression Group
Variable Positive Negative Neutral All Participants
W-REC .36** .15 33** .31**
W-INT -.15 -.29* -.16 -.21**
ACT .10 -.00 .02 .06
INTRUS -.06 .18 .01 .04
MOOD2 .20 .09 .03 .12
FINALMOOD -.03 .12 .08 .04
NEG .57** .27* .51** .48**
PL-NEG .54** .59** .70** .62**
* = P<.05 **=p<.01
INTRUS is the number of times that participants reported thoughts of the to-be-
suppressed material during the suppression time.
MOOD2 is the Depression Adjective Checklist (DACL) taken after the mood 
induction.
FINALMOOD is the DACL taken after all experimental manipulations and 
measures.
NEG is the number of negative adjectives recalled.
PL-NEG is the positive adjectives recalled minus the negative adjectives recalled.
Appendix H. continued
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Table 47. Correlations with Negative Adjectives Recalled (NEG).
Variable_______Positive________ Negative_______ Neutral______ All Participants
AGE .29* .12 .27* .20**
YEAR -.06 .02 .09 .03
HEALTH .20 -.16 -.09 .01
MOOD1 .24 -.03 .14 .13
VOCAB .11 .08 .25 .15*
WBSI .07 .10 _ 34** -.05
VVIQ .04 .22 -.04 .08
DIGSYM .29* .16 .25* .24**
TCQD -.14 .12 -.09 -.04
TCQP .08 -.16 .45** .12
TCQR .17 .05 .06 .11
TCQW .05 -.03 .42** .14
TCQS -.17 -.16 -.19 -.17*
TCQTO -.00 -.08 .15 .02
W-REC 44** .15 .42** .36**
W-INT .03 .03 -.23** -.06
ACT .24 .20 .17 .21*
INTRUS -.04 .03 -.24 -.11
MOOD2 -.03 .09 -24 -.05
FINALMOOD -.29 .07 -.22 -.16*
PLUS .57** .27* .51** .48**
PL-NEG _ 39** -.62** -.26* -.40**
* = E <-05 ** = E < - 0 1
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Table 48. Correlations with Positive minus Negative Adjectives (PL-NEG).
Variable_______Positive________ Negative_______ Neutral______ All Participants
AGE .01 .04 i b L/i .01
YEAR -.01 -.03 -.11 -.04
HEALTH -.18 .09
qi -.05
MOOD1 -.09 -.08 -.11 -.09
VOCAB .10 .04 -.12 .03
WBSI l b .01 .15 .03
VVIQ .07 -.15 .06 -.02
DIGSYM -.00 -.10 -.10 -.05
TCQD .23 .12 -.20 .03
TCQP .05 .11 -.17 -.02
TCQR .14 -.08 .08 .07
TCQW -.04 -.16 -.26* -.13
TCQS .38** .15 .18 22**
TCQTO .28* .08 -.08 .11
W-REC -.04 -.00 .02 .00
W-INT -.20 -.25 .01 -.16*
ACT -.13 -.05 -.11 -.14
INTRUS -.02 .12 .21 .14
MOOD2 .25 -.21 .23 .17*
FINALMOOD .26* .02 .28* .19*
PLUS .54** .59** .70** .62**
NEG -.39** -.62** -.26* -.40**
* = e <.05 ** = p <.01
APPENDIX I
ANOVA AND ANCOVA TABLES FOR MAIN ANALYSES
Table 49. ANCOVA for PLUS.
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Corrected Model 79.84 6 13.31 4.38 .00
Intercept 210.98 1 210.98 69.50 .00
WAISRECALL 54.53 1 54.53 17.96 .00
Suppression 19.29 2 9.65 3.18 .04
Memory Load 0.69 1 0.69 0.23 .64
Supp. By Mem 0.82 2 0.41 0.14 .87
Error 525.14 173 3.04
Total 2796.00 180
Corrected Total 604.98 179
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Table 50. ANCOVA forNEG.
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Corrected Model 71.49 6 11.91 5.50 .00
Intercept 91.13 1 91.13 42.07 .00
WAISRECALL 57.39 1 57.39 26.50 .00
Suppression 3.89 2 1.95 0.90 .41
Memory Load 0.10 1 0.10 0.05 .83
Supp. By Mem 9.04 2 4.52 2.09 .13
Error 374.71 173 2.17
Total 1753.00 180
Corrected Total 446.19 179
Table 51. ANOVA for PL-NEG.
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Corrected Model 20.69 5 4.14 1.36 .24
Intercept 113.61 1 113.61 37.25 .00
Suppression 12.08 2 6.04 1.98 .14
Memory Load 0.27 1 0.27 0.09 .77
Supp. By Mem 8.34 2 4.17 1.37 .26
Error 530.70 174 3.05
Total 665.00 180
Corrected Total 551.39 179
Appendix I, continued
Table 52. ANOVA i r Intrusions During Suppression Period-
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Corrected Mode i 23.10 5 4.62 3.66 .00
Intercept 790.36 1 790.36 626.41 .00
Suppression 14.72 2 7.36 5.84 .00
Memory Load 7.19 1 7.19 5.70 .02
Supp. By Mem 1.19 2 0.59 0.47 .63
Error 219.54 174 1.26
Total 1033.00 180
C nrected Total 242.64 179
Fable 53. ANOVA for Final Mood.
Source
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean
Squares
F
Ratio
F
Prob.
Corrected Model 259.96 6 43.32 2.04 .06
Intercept 7910.51 1 7910.51 371.76 .00
WAISRECALL 106.36 1 106.36 5.00 .03
Suppression 34.97 2 17.49 0.82 .44
Memory Load 8.47 1 8.47 0.40 .53
Supp. By Mem 70.82 2 35.41 1.66 .19
Error 3681.24 173 21.28
Total 11782.00 180
Corrected Total 3941.20 179
APPENDIX J
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS FOR PL-NG OF THE HIGH DIGIT SYMBOL SAMPLE 
Inspection of the plot in Figure 1 (see page 31) suggests that memory load may 
differentially effect PL-NG depending on the type of suppression. In order to test this 
hypothesis, the following simple effects were tested using independent t-tests: one vs. 
three, one vs. five, three vs. five, two vs. four, four vs. six, and two vs. six. Each level
between .05 and .10 will be discussed as a trend in need of further replication. Please see 
Table 54 for a summary of the results from these comparisons.
Table 54. Pairwise Comparisons for Differences in PL-NG.
Comparisons
Mean
Differences df t 2
1 vs 3 1.05 38 1.86 .07
1 vs 5 0.35 38 0.54 .59
3 vs 5 -0.70 38 -1.35 .19
2 vs 4 -0.04 38 -0.72 .48
2 vs 6 -1.45 38 -2.80 <.01
4 vs 6 -1.05 38 -1.94 .06
The only comparison which was statistically significant showed that the mean of 
group six was greater than the mean of group two (p < .01). However, a trend appeared 
and suggested that the mean of group six may be greater than the mean of group four
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(p = .06). In summary, low memory load was associated with greater recall of positive 
adjectives in relation to negative adjectives only when neutral material was being 
suppressed.
Testing the relationship between high memory load and the types of suppression 
yielded no statistically significant results (all p 's > .19) . However, a trend was noted 
suggesting that the mean of group one may be larger than the mean of group three (p = 
.07).
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